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Abstract

Much of the literature on pricing commercial mortgages
and commercial mortgage-backed securities has assumed
homogeneity in prepayment penalty structure. This study
provides evidence that such an assumption is inappropriate and
examines the effect of penalty structures observed in actual
contracts. After conducting preliminary simulations, hazard
models estimated from data on 1,165 multifamily mortgage loans
are presented to show how empirical prepayment rates vary with
alternative penalty structures. While yield maintenance and
lockout provisions are relatively more effective than fixed or step
down structures in reducing or postponing prepayment, none
completely eliminates the risk. The empirical results generally
confirm the theoretical findings of Kelly and Slawson (2001).

Introduction

Much attention has been directed toward understanding the performance of
commercial, especially multifamily, mortgages, given the dramatic increase in
commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) issuance and recent pricing and
liquidity problems.1 Most earlier research (e.g., Titman and Torous, 1989; Kau,
Keenan, Muller and Epperson, 1990; Vandell, 1992; Vandell, Barnes, Hartzell,
Kraft and Wendt, 1993; and Goldberg and Capone, 1997) focuses on default risk
and assumes away prepayment risk, on the view that commercial mortgages
contain prepayment penalties, lockouts or yield maintenance provisions that render
prepayment unlikely, or fully compensate the lender.
However, a careful empirical look at prepayment exercise among commercial and
multifamily mortgages reveals that prepayment does occur and cannot be ignored,
especially since it may produce pricing fluctuations an order of magnitude greater
than default risk. Prepayment occurs because (1) the assumed penalties do not
exist, (2) they exist but are less effective than assumed, or (3) borrowers overexercise prepayment irrationally, perhaps motivated by factors outside the standard
model framework.
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Accordingly, more recent research on commercial mortgages (e.g., Abraham and
Theobold, 1997; Boyer, Follain, Ondrich and Piccirillo, 1997; Capone and
Goldberg, 1998; Daingerfield, 1995; Elmer and Haifdorfer, 1997; Follain, Ondrich
and Sinha, 1997; Follain, Huang and Ondrich, 1999; and Kelly and Slawson,
2001) has focused on prepayments. Among these, only Abraham and Theobald
and Kelly and Slawson address alternative penalty structures, and the latter only
through simulation. This study examines, both theoretically and empirically, using
estimation as well as simulation, the extent to which alternative prepayment
penalty structures can be expected to—and actually do—affect prepayment
exercise among multifamily mortgage borrowers. Results can inform pricing
models for both commercial mortgages and their mortgage-backed securities.
The paper is structured follows. First, related past research is reviewed. Next, a
simplified option-theoretic model is developed that explicitly incorporates five
observed prepayment penalty structures and simulates expected prepayments in a
stochastic interest rate environment. Results of the simulation provide explanatory
variables used in the subsequent empirical analysis are next presented. The
empirical model, data and report results follow. Finally, general conclusions and
implications of the results are presented.

兩

Past Research

Empirical research using single-family data has shown that both default and
prepayment options appear to be under-exercised, relative to the predictions of the
option-theoretic approach (Quigley and Van Order, 1990, 1995). This has led to
debate over the role of transaction costs and the degree of ‘‘ruthlessness’’ among
option holders (Vandell, 1995). An alternative view holds that it is trigger events
that often prompt default and prepayment and these decisions are only imperfectly
related to underlying option values (Riddiough and Thompson, 1993). In the single
family market, borrower mobility and institutional constraints that prevent
refinancing may provide further explanation, for instance, insufficient equity or
impaired credit may constrain prepayments (Peristiani, Bennett, Monsen, Peach
and Raiff, 1997; and Green and LaCour-Little, 1999).
Some argue that irrational option exercise may be less an issue in the commercial
mortgage market, since investors in income property do not relocate, triggering
prepayments, in the way that single-family mortgagors do, though they may have
heterogeneous or tax-induced holding period preferences. Moreover, financially
sophisticated investors seem more likely to ‘‘ruthlessly’’ exercise their options.
Default in commercial mortgages has been thoroughly explored in Vandell (1992)
and Vandell, Barnes, Hartzell, Kraft and Wendt (1993), who still find underexercise compared to theoretical model predictions, although at a lower level than
Foster and Van Order (1985) find in the single-family market, using similar
methodology.
Turning to recent studies of commercial mortgages, Abraham and Theobald
(A&T) (1997) develop a simple prepayment model using a sample of 7,800
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multifamily mortgages owned by Freddie Mac and originated over the period
1984–1990. Following Foster and Van Order’s (1985) work in the single-family
segment, A&T find that multifamily has lower prepayment risk at discount
coupons and higher prepayment risk at premium coupons (i.e., that multifamily
loans have greater interest rate sensitivity compared to single-family). Since their
data set includes some variation in prepayment penalties (lockouts, yield
maintenance and step down structures), the effect of the prepayment penalty over
time may be observed. A&T describe the function as a ‘‘hockey stick’’ pattern,
in which prepayments are close to zero during the lock-out period, then inflecting
sharply (to roughly a 45⬚ angle) once the prepayment penalty period has expired.
Follain, Ondrich and Singha (FO&S) (1997) consider whether prepayments in the
commercial mortgage market are indeed more ‘‘ruthless’’ compared to the singlefamily market. FO&S use loan-level data on 1,083 multifamily loans originated
during 1975–1986 and tracked through 1989 to estimate a mortgage prepayment
function. Over the study period, 451 loans prepaid, 20 defaulted and the balance
survived. All were subject to a single prepayment penalty, which FO&S treat as
a prepayment-reducing transaction cost, consisting of six months interest if the
loan is less than five years old and 1% of outstanding loan balance thereafter.
While they find that their measure for the option value is positive and statistically
significant across models, the implied hazard model predicts relatively low values
(never exceeding 10% until loan age exceeds ten years), even when the
prepayment option is deep in the money.
Elmer and Haidorfer (E&H) (1997) focus on prepayments of RTC commercial
mortgage-backed securities issued during 1991–1992. E&H use cross-sectional
time series methods to calculate 12-month conditional prepayment rates as of
December 1995 in the range of 13%–18%, substantially higher than the hazard
rate results of FO&S. These higher rates may be related to the absence of
prepayment penalties on these loans or loan seasoning, although E&H are silent
on the topic of prepayment penalties, if any exist.
Capone and Goldberg (1998) use data on Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae cash
purchases of 13,338 multifamily mortgage loans originated during the period
1983–1995. They augment their data to create time-varying estimates of vacancy
rate and property net operating income. Simulation results show relatively low
conditional prepayment rates (never exceeding 10% annually) for 30-year fully
amortized loans even when the option is significantly in the money; however,
prepayment rates for 10-year balloons are very high (over 40%) in periods around
the balloon date.
Maxam and Fisher (M&F) (1998) focus on pricing effects on CMBS issues backed
by multiple property types in which lock-outs preclude rate-driven prepayments
but in which defaults may produce early return of principal to senior security
holders. Among innovations, M&F use kernel density regression to model security
prices as a function of property indices and mortgage rates. M&F argue that
although senior tranches are theoretically immune from prepayment risk, the
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transformation of default to prepayment risk is evident in the pricing relationships
generated.
Follain, Huang and Ondrich (1999) examine default and prepayment risk in FHAinsured multifamily loans, using a competing risks-proportional hazards method.
They find evidence consistent with the option pricing theory of prepayments but
very low rates of prepayment during the initial twenty years of a thirty-year
mortgage. This pattern is even more pronounced for those loans in their data that
were secured by Section 8 properties, possibly because public subsidy utilization
produces a substantial disincentive for prepayment.
Kelly and Slawson (K&S) (2001) use simulation to address the value of delay in
the case of commercial mortgages containing prepayment penalties. Their
approach extends the line of research showing a value to delay for both default
and prepayment options in the single-family market (Kau and Kim, 1994).
Intuitively, an additional cost to exercising an option today is the loss of the right
to exercise that same option in the future. K&S consider a full range of possible
prepayment penalties, including permanent, fixed, step-down, yield maintenance
and lockouts, but adopt an admittedly simplistic view of default, in which cash
flows are proportional to property values and asset values follow a standard
diffusion process. K&S find that time-varying prepayment penalties significantly
affect optimal prepayment decisions, since the value of delay differs between static
and declining prepayment penalty structures. Among their conclusions, K& S state
that ‘‘it is crucial that empirical researchers consider the effect of time-varying
prepayment penalties.’’ 2 The empirical effort here follows this prescription.
In summary, both single-family and multifamily research has been hampered by
the lack of detailed data that would allow researchers to separate call option
exercise from borrower mobility effects (in the single-family area) and detailed
information on the nature and extent of prepayment penalties (in the multifamily
area). The current research remedies these problems through use of micro-level
data on 1,165 multifamily mortgage loans, with heterogeneous prepayment
penalties, originated during the period 1991–1996 and observed through April
2000.

兩

Expectations from Option Theory: Simulation Results

A binomial option-pricing model is solved first, which has been extended to
include alternative prepayment penalties. Default risk is excluded for the purposes
of the simulation and to focus on prepayments.3 The analysis borrows from Tian
(1992) and Deng (1997) the method of interest rate simulation. Tian proposes a
simplified binomial process to mimic the interest rate processes. This method is
later adopted by Deng to replicate the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) (1985) interest
rate process and then used to evaluate mortgage prepayment and default option
values.4 Under the CIR assumption, the spot interest rate follows:
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(1)

where r is the spot interest rate,  is the speed of mean reversion,  is the longterm interest rate,  is volatility and dz is a standard Wiener process.
Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff and Sanders (1992) use the generalized method of
moments to estimate the parameters of the CIR process. Using data through
December 2000, they recently re-estimated the parameters to be:  ⫽ 0.2536;
 ⫽ 0.0715; and  ⫽ 0.0899.5 An initial spot rate of 7% is assumed here. Under
this risk-neutral interest rate environment, the value of a 10-year 7.5% interestonly balloon mortgage and the value of the prepayment penalty using backward
induction along the binomial interest rate tree are computed. The value of the
mortgage V0 with maturity m at time t is:
Vm ⫽ Paymentm
d
⫺r (t)
Vt ⫽ Paymentt ⫹ min(P ut * V ut⫹1 * e⫺r (t) ⫹ P td * V t⫹1
,
*e

(Balancet ⫹ Penaltyt))
V0 ⫽ min(P u0 * V u1 * e⫺r (0) ⫹ P d0 * V d1 * e⫺r (0)
(Balance0 ⫹ Penalty0)),

(2)

where P ut is the probability the interest rate moves up in the next month at time
t and P dt is the probability the interest rate moves down in the next month at time
t. V ut⫹1 is the value of the mortgage at time t ⫹ 1 if the interest rate moves up
from time t to t ⫹ 1, and V dt⫹1 is the value of the mortgage at time t ⫹ 1 if the
interest rate moves down from time t to t ⫹ 1. r(t) is the spot interest rate and
Paymentt is the scheduled monthly payment at time t. Each month, the borrower
evaluates whether it is profitable to exercise its prepayment option by comparing
the option exercise price, equaling the outstanding mortgage balance (Balancet)
plus prepayment penalty (Penaltyt) and the expected present value of the mortgage
in the next period. At mortgage maturity m, the value of the mortgage is its last
payment. The value of the prepayment penalty is the difference between the value
of the mortgage with prepayment penalty, and the value of the mortgage with zero
prepayment penalty. Hence, the simulation effectively assumes optimal (or
‘‘ruthless’’) exercise of the prepayment option, taking into account the cost (if
any) of exercising the option.
To focus on prepayment effects and because the data contained few defaults,6 the
default option was ignored and included only prepayments. Five different penalty
structures are described below:
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1. No prepayment penalty. The base case, with zero transaction cost, which
we expect will result in the maximum prepayment rate for a given set of
conditions.
2. A lockout, or prohibition against prepayment until time period t, which
is specified as an infinite prepayment penalty at each point in time and
results in zero prepayment under all conditions. If t ⫽ T, the balloon term
of the note, this structure effectively establishes the opposite condition to
Equation (1). When t ⬍ T, there is a temporary lockout, in which
prepayment is prohibited only up until time t (this is the usual case with
actual contracts). In the simulations here, the magnitude of t is varied:
t ⫽ T ⫽ 10, t ⫽ 5, t ⫽ 3 and t ⫽ 1 year.
3. A fixed prepayment penalty, specified as a percentage of the current
outstanding loan balance. Again, the levels and time periods are varied.
In the simulations, the levels varied: p ⫽ 5%, 3% and 1% and t ⫽ T ⫽
10 years or t ⫽ 5 years.
4. Step-down prepayment penalty, which resembles the fixed penalty, except
that the penalty level drops at intervals toward zero rather than all at once.
A step-function is first assumed from level p ⫽ 5% at the end of year
5, to 4% at the end of year 6, etc., to 1% at the end of year 9 and zero
by the end of year 10 (the balloon). Alternatively, it was assumed that
p ⫽ 3% at the end of year 5 to 2% at the end of year 6, to 1% at the
end of year 7 and zero by the end of year 8.
5. A yield-maintenance formula, in which the penalty is a function of current
interest rates, structured to compensate for losses when prepayments occur
in a declining rate environment. A variety of such formulae have emerged
[see summary in Cheng, Cooper and Huang (1997)]. Note that all are
imperfect proxies for ‘‘making one whole’’ as the result of the exercise
of prepayment because of implicit assumptions about reinvestment rates.
In the simulations, the following formula was used, as contained in actual
contracts used by the supplier of the data:
pt ⫽ (rc ⫺ rmt)[(1 ⫺ (1 ⫺ rmt)⫺n)/rmt],

(3)

where pt ⫽ prepayment penalty in time t as a fraction of the remaining balance,
rc ⫽ 1/12 the contract rate on the note, rmt ⫽ 1/12 the current Treasury rate
for notes of maturity equal to the remaining term to maturity on the note, and
n ⫽ the remaining term to maturity on the note, in months.
Notice that the yield-maintenance formulation results in a stochastic penalty, ex
ante, since interest rates are uncertain, while other penalty amounts are known.
This will have an impact on pricing the prepayment option and the probability of
prepayment ceteris paribus.
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The results, including both pricing effects and prepayment patterns over time, are
summarized in Exhibits 1–3. Note the following:
1. As expected, the absence of any penalty produces the highest prepayment
rate. As shown in Exhibit 4, the probability of prepayment prior to term
(10 years) is 92.1% and after five years is 77.8%. The option value is
also greatest with no penalty, at 7.2% of par. The variable pattern of
prepayment after month 84 is due to the lumpiness in the simulation
procedure.
2. Fixed prepayment penalties over the term also reduce prepayment. As the
penalty level increases from 1% to 5%, rates (relative to that for no
prepayment penalty) became progressively lower in the earlier and later
years and more ‘‘peaked’’ (Exhibit 1). The cumulative rate of prepayment
and value of the prepayment option also decline (Exhibit 4).
3. A fixed prepayment penalty over a term of five years produces a
prepayment rate lower than if the penalty was over the full term, and the
rate becomes geometrically lower as one approaches the ‘‘cliff’’ (i.e., the
end of the penalty term). However, the rate jumps considerably after the
penalty term, increasingly so for stronger penalties (Exhibit 1). Although
cumulative rates of prepayment were significantly lower than in the case
of no prepayment penalty after five years, almost this entire decline was
made up by the end of the term. The cumulative rate of prepayment at
the end of term was within 10% of what it would have been with no
prepayment penalty, for term penalties up to 5% (Exhibit 4).
4. The existence of a lockout over the term, likewise, produces no
prepayments; hence, zero value for the prepayment option (Exhibit 2).7
When the lockout expires prior to the ten-year term of the note,
prepayment is delayed until that time. The longer the lockout period, in
general, the greater the rate of prepayment that immediately follows.
However, timing of prepayment is extended and the cumulative rate of
prepayment reduced as lockout term increases (Exhibit 4).
5. Step-down penalties produce complex ‘‘sawtooth’’ patterns (Exhibit 3).
Prepayments tend to decline in anticipation of an upcoming drop in the
penalty level; then, immediately thereafter, they increase again. These
patterns were repeating in the case of successive drops in penalty levels.
The drop and subsequent rise was most extreme when the penalty level
and drop were both high, such as in the 3-1-0% penalty structure relative
to the 5-4-3-2-1-0% penalty structure. The cumulative prepayment rates
and prepayment option values for step-down penalties displayed in
Exhibit 4 suggest that they delay prepayment less than the five-year fixed
penalty until after year five. The increase above the fixed-over-term
prepayment penalty case after year five, however, is also less than that
for the five-year fixed penalty. The net result is a cumulative rate of
prepayment and value of the prepayment option that is in between that
of the fixed-over-term and the five-year fixed prepayment penalty.
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E x h i b i t 4 兩 Simulation of Alternative Prepayment Penalty Structures: Probability of Prepayment after 5 and
10 Years and Value of the Prepayment Option

Cumulative Probability of Prepayment

Value of Prepayment
Option

After 5 Years (%)

After 10 Years (%)

(Discount from Par) (%)

No Prepayment Penalty

77.81

92.10

7.24

Fixed Prepayment Penalty
Over life of loan
5%
3%
1%

64.32
67.26
72.89

73.93
80.33
87.77

2.95
4.02
5.18

Over 5 years
5%
3%
1%

38.28
55.11
64.94

85.71
88.21
89.25

4.83
5.59
6.63

Step-down After Five Years
5-4-3-2-1-0%
3-2-1-0%

52.34
62.84

82.84
88.22

4.39
5.04

Lockout
Over life of loan
Over 5 years
Over 3 years
Over 1 year

0
0
61.10
74.00

0
81.55
86.74
90.79

0.00
3.91
4.66
5.71

Yield Maintenance

24.18

32.07

0.07

Notes: Parameter values for simulation: mortgage note rate ⫽ 7.5%, amortization term ⫽ ⬁
(interest-only), term to maturity ⫽ 10 years. Interest rate process starts with 7% spot rate,
 ⫽ 0.2536,  ⫽0.0715 and  ⫽0.0899.

6. Finally, the yield maintenance formula used in the simulations is found
to be quite effective, both at lowering the exercise of prepayment and
especially at lowering the value of the prepayment option. Prepayment
occurs only over the first forty-eight months of loan life and between
month 108 and the end of term, and the maximum rate is only about 14%.
Exhibit 4 confirms that yield maintenance has the lowest cumulative
prepayment rate and lowest option value among penalty designs
evaluated, except for lockouts.
The simulation results are generally consistent with the results of Kelly and
Slawson (2001), particularly the reduction in prepayment before the ‘‘cliff’’ of
penalty reduction, followed by an increase after the reduction or elimination of
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the penalty, and the sawtooth pattern resulting from the step-down structure. This
is interesting, since a relatively simpler simulation process is used and default
excluded. One interpretation would be that regardless of the analytic method used,
prepayment penalties matter and time-varying penalties affect matter the most.
Other results include the effectiveness of yield maintenance formulation in
controlling prepayment and reducing its impact on pricing. They also reveal
expected effects of various covariates on prepayment over time, including the
parameters associated with penalty design, other mortgage terms and
macroeconomic variables that can motivate prepayment.

兩

The Empirical Model: Specification

The simulations described suggest the following variables for inclusion in the
empirical model.
1. The level of the contract rate on the loan relative to the current market
rate and the present value of savings on refinancing, net of penalty costs;
2. The expected trend in mortgage rates, proxied by the shape of the yield
curve;
3. The expected volatility of mortgage rates;
4. The level of the current prepayment penalty;
5. The remaining term on the mortgage;
6. The outstanding balance on the loan at the end of term as a fraction of
original loan balance;
7. ‘‘Burnout,’’ or the extent to which the loan has already been exposed to
positive refinancingincentives;
8. The prepayment penalty ‘‘type, and related characteristics;
9. The remaining term(s) until any reduction(s) in the current prepayment
penalty;
10. The magnitude of expected reduction(s) in the current prepayment
penalty; and
11. Uncertainty in the level(s) of future prepayment penalties.
These time-varying covariates relate to the pure options framework and do not
include other factors that may be influential but arise outside of the pure options
framework. Such variables may be associated with transaction costs, factors
influencing borrower demand or information asymmetries. They may relate to the
property, the borrower or the lender, as well as the loan terms and the
macroeconomic environment. Those that have been identified in the literature on
multifamily prepayment previously discussed include:

M o r t g a g e

P r e p a y m e n t s

U n d e r

P e n a l t y

S t r u c t u r e s

兩

2 5 7

12. The current loan-to-value ratio;
13. The expected trend in the future loan-to-value ratio; and
14. Uncertainty with respect to the future loan-to-value ratio.
Variables (12) through (14) are primarily relevant to default. Since previous work
(Kau, Keenan, Muller and Epperson, 1992) has shown the default option to be
interrelated with the prepayment option in the sense that default is a form of
prepayment and borrowers who would otherwise prepay may find it optimal to
default if they are prevented from prepayment, it may be important to consider
the default option, at least in a competing risks framework. LTV may also be
important in prepayment from an institutional standpoint, since underwriting rules
make refinancing high LTV loans difficult, especially if property values declines.
This phenomenon has been documented in the single-family market (Green and
LaCour-Little, 1999; and Mattey and Wallace, 1999a).
15. Seasoning, or elapsed time since origination.
This variable could represent a number of factors, including increasing or
decreasing commitment or ‘‘attachment’’ to the investment over time (‘‘attachment
to neighborhood and the housing unit’’ has been shown to be important in single
family prepayments), the increased probability of ‘‘trigger events’’ or the need to
consume liquid assets to maintain the current investment.
16. Seasonality.
This variable could represent seasonally correlated trigger events that motivate
sales or refinancings, such as end of the calendar, fiscal, or tax year, or the timing
of quarterly reports, although it does not correspond directly to the seasonal
patterns of household mobility that are evident in single family prepayment
models.
17. Financial sophistication of the investor or information availability,
proxied by loan size or networth of borrower;
18. Tax law changes, which could affect any of the option-theoretic or other
variables influencing prepayment;
19. Borrower solvency, proxied by the contemporaneous debt-coverage ratio;
20. Type of borrower, which may proxy for borrower sophistication in
recognizing prepayment advantages and knowledge of prepayment
procedures;
21. Type of lender, which may proxy for the degree of aggressiveness in
educating borrowers about prepayment opportunities relative to the
aggressiveness of other lenders.
An analysis of these other external factors (items 17–21 above) will not occur
here. Note, however, that although model default is not explicitly modeled,
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covariates are included that proxy for default risk, such as LTV in hazard model
specification.

兩

A Proportional Hazards Model of Multifamily
Prepayments

Green and Shoven (1986) first applied the proportional hazard model to
mortgages, and recent applications are numerous (e.g., Schwartz and Torous, 1992;
Vandell, Barnes, Hartzell, Kraft and Wendt, 1993; Deng, 1995, 1997; Follain,
Ondrich and Sinha, 1997; Mattey and Wallace, 1999; and Bennett, Peach and
Peristiani, 2001). In hazard models, failure time T (in mortgage modeling, failure
time is the time to prepayment and/or default) has probability density distribution
ƒ(Ti) and cumulative probability distribution F(Ti). The hazard function H(Ti) is
defined as:

H(Ti) ⫽ lim
t→0

Prob(Ti ⬍ T ⬍ Ti ⫹ t 兩 T ⱖ Ti)
ƒ(Ti)
⫽
.
t
1 ⫺ F(Ti)

(4)

If time is measured in infinitely small discrete units, the hazard function is simply:

H(Ti) ⫽ Prob(T ⫽ Ti 兩 T ⱖ Ti) ⫽

ƒ(Ti)
.
1 ⫺ F(Ti)

(5)

Intuitively, the hazard rate is the probability of failure time being Ti, given the
fact that the subject survives up to time Ti, or, roughly, the conditional probability
of failure at time Ti.
Theoretically, the hazard function can take any functional form. One particular
functional form that is widely used in mortgage modeling is Cox’s proportional
hazard specification. The hazard rate for subject j at time i is:

Hij (xij ;␤) ⫽ H0(xi) exp(xij ␤).

(6)

In this specification, H0 is the baseline hazard, i.e., the hazard rate if all covariates
xij are zero. In the mortgage literature, the baseline hazard is typically specified
using either loan-age dummies or a polynomial function of loan age intended to
capture the seasoning ramp. The baseline hazard is shifted by explanatory vector
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xij, which represents the mortgage characteristics or market conditions for
mortgage j at time i.
One advantage of using the proportional hazard model is that the ␤ coefficients
can be estimated using Cox’s partial likelihood method without specifying a
baseline function. Thus, the effects of various prepayment penalties can be
quantified on borrower’s prepayment behaviors without having to assume any
particular functional form of the baseline hazard itself. But to generate conditional
prepayment predictions, the baseline hazard must be specified as well.
This is not a trivial exercise. Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), Han and Hausman
(1990), Meyer (1990) and Sueyoshi (1992) propose semi-parametric methods that
can estimate the baseline hazard and the ␤ coefficients simultaneously. But their
methods are computationally demanding. Deng (1995) proposes a semi-parametric
method that transforms the proportional hazard model into a system of seemingly
unrelated regressions. His method can deal with competing risks and is
computationally feasible for large data sets. This method involves group loans into
relatively homogeneous cells and requires large amount of data.
Cox’s partial likelihood method was selected to test the propositions embodied in
the model specification above, focusing on the impact of various prepayment
penalties on the prepayment hazard. This makes Cox’s partial likelihood method
especially desirable, since the estimates of the ␤ coefficients can be recovered
without assuming a particular functional form for baseline hazard. Follain,
Ondrich and Sinha (1997) attempt to extend the Cox model into a competing risks
framework that recognizes the existence of possible failure due to both prepayment
and default. However, since our data contains few defaults, the competing risk
model estimates would be difficult, if not impossible, to estimate, especially when
we are examining the timing, as well as the incidence, of events. Accordingly, we
treat the small number of defaults as censored. Other research on prepayments in
the single-family market has shown that when there are only a very small number
of defaults, obtaining statistically significant results is unlikely (Ambrose and
LaCour-Little, 2001).8
To recover the baseline hazard, a two-step limited information maximum
likelihood method is applied. In the first step, the Cox’s partial likelihood is
performed to obtain the estimated ␤ˆ coefficients. In the second step, the baseline
hazard is expressed as a function of mortgage age:

Hij (xij;␤) ⫽ H0(MortgageAge) exp(xij ␤ˆ ).

(7)

where ␤ˆ is the estimated ␤ coefficients from the first step partial likelihood
procedure. Notice that by substituting ␤ with ␤ˆ , the term exp(xij␤ˆ ) is now a known
quantity. The baseline hazard can be estimated using the maximum likelihood
method. The log likelihood function is:
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冘 冘 (I(Prepayment) * log(H (MortgageAge)
∀i

∀j

0

* exp(xij␤ˆ )) ⫹ (1 ⫺ I(Prepayment))
* log(1 ⫺ H0(MortgageAge) * exp(xij␤ˆ ))),

(8)

where I(Prepayment) is an indicator variable equaling 1 if the mortgage was
prepaid in month j and 0 otherwise. Murphy and Topel (1985) show that the
maximum likelihood estimators at the second step are consistent and
asymptotically normal.
The seasoning ramp for multifamily mortgages has been little studied.9 Lacking a
particular shape to the hazard function, the baseline hazard is modeled as a
polynomial of mortgage age, allowing flexibility in functional forms:
H0(MortgageAge) ⫽ (␣1 * MortgageAge ⫹ ␣2 * MortgageAge2
⫹ ␣3 * MortgageAge3).

(9)

This two-step estimation method can take full advantage of the desirable features
of Cox’s partial likelihood method. Computational simplicity is a further
attraction.
As previously discussed, many argue that default and prepayment probabilities be
jointly determined and thus be estimated simultaneously under a competing risk
framework (e.g., Deng, 1995; and Deng, Quigley and Van Order, 2000). Those
models assume a correlation structure in the error terms of prepayment and default
equations. Computations are considerably more complicated. In our data set,
default risk is very low (there are only 36 out of 1,165 loans defaulted during the
study period). To address the competing risk issue, the variables influencing
default (such as LTV, regional dummies) were incorporated into the prepayment
equation, instead of modeling the competing risk explicitly through adding a
default equation and a correlated error structure.
It has also been recognized that there is unobserved heterogeneity among
borrowers. This heterogeneity is caused by the inability to identify all
characteristics influencing prepayment behavior. Ignoring heterogeneity may bias
parameter estimates. Unobserved heterogeneity is the source of ‘‘burnout’’ in
prepayment modeling: two seemingly identical borrowers respond to identical
prepayment incentive differently. Modeling ‘‘burnout’’ has been a very difficult
job in prepayment modeling. Traditionally, it has been modeled ex post through
measuring borrower’s past response (or failure in responding) to refinancing
opportunities. Another type of burnout modeling explicitly assumes a distribution
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of prepayment response functions among groups of borrowers [see Hall (2000)
for a review]. In industry models, this approach is in a form of ‘‘multi-population
model’’ (e.g., Hayre, 1994; Hayre, Chaudhary and Young, 2000; or Patruno, 1994).
A typical multi-population model assumes the borrowers belong to several
populations (in practice, it is usually fewer than three populations for
computational simplicity). Populations are assumed to have different refinancing
sensitivities. As the borrowers are exposed to refinancing opportunities, the
borrowers in the more refinancing sensitive groups prepay faster than the less
sensitive groups and exit the population earlier, leaving the whole population with
larger composition of ‘‘slower’’ refinancers. The overall refinancing sensitivities
of the population is thus lowered. With several exceptions, academic research on
this class of model has been rare. Stanton (1995) assumes a continuous distribution
of transaction costs among all borrowers and calibrates the distribution on the
observed data. The calibrated transaction costs, however, are unreasonably high
(about 40%), which casts some doubt on an otherwise reasonable modeling
approach. Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000) assume 2-3 populations of
borrowers in prepayment function. Deng and Quigley (2001) further extend the
model in assuming a continuous distribution of borrower heterogeneity and
incorporate a variable measuring a borrower’s past failure in responding to
refinancing opportunities into the distribution assumption of borrower
heterogeneity. Both models show that unobserved heterogeneity exists and matters
in prepayment modeling. The disadvantage of this multi/continuous population
model, besides the great complexity involved, is that the choice of population is
arbitrary, and there is no definitive evidence showing better performance relative
to simpler approaches. Note that Ambrose and LaCour-Little (2000) employed the
competing risk methodology controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and
produced results qualitatively similar to simpler models without such controls.
Accordingly, this study employs the simpler approach by simply including a
measure of ‘‘burnout’’ equal to the cumulative sum of the past refinancing
opportunities (constrained to zero during lockout period, if any).

兩

Data

Data collection began with a loan level database of 2,573 multifamily mortgage
loans serviced by a major loan-servicing firm that prefers anonymity. Loans were
originated throughout the United States during the 1991–1996 period and initially
observed through June 1998. Most are portfolio loans, not collateral for CMBS.
Initially, loan servicing records were examined to extract origination date,
termination date and time-of-origination loan characteristics, such as loan size and
type, note rate and loan-to-value ratio. Since numerous characteristics of interest
were not included on the loan servicing system, data was augmented by a detailed
file-by-file review and included a 100% sample of terminated loans plus an equal
number of randomly drawn still-active loans. This review allowed examination of
important details about prepayment penalty structure. The information obtained
included type of penalty (if any) and the formula for calculating the penalty over
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time. As in most data collection efforts, there were occasional missing values,
which were assumed to be uninformative. After sampling, the final data set
consisted of 1,165 loans, of which about half prepaid during the observation
period. The mean note rate is 9.05% and the mean original loan amount is
$725,000. The relatively small original loan size indicates that many of these are
smaller and older properties, as compared to large scale newly constructed
suburban apartment complexes.10
Descriptive statistics for the sample appear in Exhibit 5. There is probably some
sample selectivity at work here, since presumably borrowers (to the extent they
can) choose prepayment penalty types that best match their expectations about
holding period and future interest rate movements. It can be seen in Exhibit 5 that
loans with yield maintenance penalties, for example, tend to be much larger than
loans with fixed penalties. Perhaps more sophisticated borrowers with larger
investment properties are more willing to accept strict and market rate dependent
controls on their prepayment options, as compared to smaller investors, who prefer
fixed and known limitations. In any event, the choice of contract and penalty type
results from an unobservable bargaining process and the issue is not discussed
further here. Penalty types are stratified in the hazard models in this study, so the
results are conditional on the particular contract type selected (or bargained for)
between borrower and lender.
After initial analysis of the data and a first draft of this article, the observation
window was extended to April 2000. This had the effect of increasing the number
of prepayments significantly, due in part to the drop in mortgage rates during late
1998. Since the sampling scheme was developed in April 1998, however, the data
elements were re-weighted11 based on their prepayment status as of that point in
time. A number of time-dependent variables were also added, including the
refinancing incentive over time, loan age, remaining balance, percentage remaining
balance, months until balloon or maturity, slope of the term structure, volatility
of interest rates, and, of course, the amount of penalty due on refinancing at each
point in time.
Prepayment models normally require some benchmark rate to be used as the
‘‘market rate.’’ In single-family models, agency par yields or the Freddie Mac
primary mortgage market survey rate are common choices. Since no obvious,
similar benchmark for commercial loans was available, the mean rate for new
commercial mortgages originated during the month and year of observation was
used the measure of market rate. This seemed preferable to adding an arbitrarily
chosen spread to Treasury rates and captures the time-varying mortgage-treasury
yield spread.
Loans were grouped into the following categories based on prepayment penalty
type: fixed, lockout, none, other, step down and yield maintenance. Most of the
loans have lock-outs for some period of time, followed by fixed penalties (fixed
as percentage of loan balance, therefore, declining over time as the loan balance
amortizes). For stratification, step-down and yield maintenance penalty types were
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Variable

Mean

Original loan balance

$454,826

Note rate

Lockouts
Std. Dev.

Fraction prepaid

Std. Dev.

$511,916

7.27

0.45

$5,239,009

8.80

3.51

Mean

0.41

Std. Dev.

$505,970

5.86

YIeld Maintenance

$4,670,345

8.55

3.67

Mean

0.69

Std. Dev.

$1,993,145

3.96

Step-Down

$12,638,143

10.22

2.18

Mean
$4,775,568

5.81

0.33

Std. Dev.
$28,820,767

9.42

4.19

8.92

0.65

3.55

J R E R

61

179

63

131

32

80

89

188

59

134

Average balance

$438,537

$4,136,105

$490,343

$5,088,409

$496,470

$4,576,487

$1,632,254

$10,281,223

$4,057,861

$28,388,102

Average penalty

$10,873

$88,255

infinite

infinite

0

0

$478,876

$3,772,303

$87,829

$528,682

Vo l .

0.92

0.23

0.87

0.17

0.38

0.27

0.59

0.34

0.68

45.68

61.03

37.30

67.12

26.38

57.27

22.91

57.52

49.03

Average burnout

1.45

12.99

0.17

2.71

0.46

3.31

0.20

2.42

1.62

17.76

Average fraction amortized

0.96

0.36

0.95

0.30

0.98

0.10

0.84

1.43

0.84

1.41

0.07

0.40

Average incentive
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Average time to cliff

NA

Average time after cliff

NA

N

0.01

0.15

46
14
231

757

0.03

173

NA

54

NA

0.16

0.11

NA

NA

NA

NA

60

0.68

0.07

NA

NA

NA

NA

89

0.54
NA
NA
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Average volatility
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Average age

Mean

$4,226,519

9.45

No Penalty
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Fixed Penalty
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grouped together, since both types involve time-varying penalties that depend on
more than just the current outstanding loan balance.
Exhibit 6 shows survival curves and cumulative prepayment hazard rates for the
loan sample, stratified by penalty type. Note that these simple uncontrolled results
support our priors based on simulations. Specifically, loans with no prepayment
penalty prepay at the highest rate, while those with yield maintenance prepay the
lowest rates. In general, loans with a fixed and step-down penalty formula have
comparable survival rates, which are somewhat lower than those with lockouts.
Of course, these uncontrolled results could be reflecting a variety of influences
beyond differences in prepayment penalty types, such as prepayment penalty
terms, the timing of originations, etc. Identification of the prepayment penalty
effects in isolation requires the hazard model.

兩

Results

Four versions of the proportional hazard model were estimated: first combining
all loans and using dummy variables to represent the various penalty types,
followed by stratification of the data by penalty type, with slightly modified
specifications to account for particular features of the individual penalty structures.
The variables used in the models are defined in Exhibit 7.
Results for the entire sample appear in Exhibit 8. There were a total of 1,165
loans of which 626 (54%) prepaid during the observation period, equivalent to
roughly a 14% constant prepayment rate over an average loan age of five years.
To focus on the effect of penalty type per se, dummy variables were included for
each while the relative magnitude of the penalty appears in the variable REFIINC
as a transaction cost. Loans with no prepayment penalty represent the omitted
category. The Midwest region (the largest group of loans) is the omitted region.
Generally, signs of coefficients are as expected.
The refinancing incentive net of prepayment penalty costs (REFIINC) is positive
and highly statistically significant, consistent with option theory. Interest rate
volatility (VOLATL) is negative and highly statistically significant, consistent with
the value of delay implied by option theory. The presence of a balloon payment
within one year (BALLONE) is positive and highly significant. Loan size
(ORIBAL) is positive and statistically significant and burnout (BURNOUT) is
negative and statistically significant. The slope of the yield curve (TSPREAD) and
original loan to value ratio (LOANVAL) are both positive but not statistically
significant. The regional dummies for WEST and NE are negative and statistically
significantly, possibly because of lingering problems with commercial property
markets in those areas during the early 1990s.
Turning to penalty type, loans with any prepayment penalty display significantly
lower rates of prepayment than loans with no penalty. Among prepayment penalty
types, yield maintenance loans exhibit the lowest prepayment rates with a risk
ratio of 0.15 (all risk ratio comparisons here are relative to no prepayment
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E x h i b i t 7 兩 Variable Definitions

ORIBAL: Original loan balance.
RMBALRT: Remaining loan balance ratio ⫽ remaining loan balance/original loan balance.
REFIINC: The refinancing incentive, defined as the present value of savings less refinancing costs.
The refinancing incentive is calculated as [PV(remaining payments at market rate)/remaining balance
– 1]. Refinancing costs are the ratio of the prepayment penalty over the remaining balance. For
lockout loans during lockout period, REFIINC is set to zero, since prepayments are strictly prohibited.

冘 max(REFIINC , 0), i.e., the accumulated non-negative incentive.
t⫺1

BURNOUT: BURNOUTt ⫽

i⫽1

i

TSPREAD : Yield curve slope ⫽ LN (10-year Treasury rate/1-year Treasury rate).
VOLATL: Interest rate volatility ⫽ SQRT(12)*STD(CMT10(t) ⫺ CMT10(t ⫺ 1), where STD is the standard deviation function. SQRT(12) scales the volatility to annual numbers assuming an independent
interest rate generating process.
LOANVAL: Original loan-to-value ratio.
BALLONE: Indicator variable equaling one if the mortgage is within one year of the maturity, and
zero otherwise. Most contracts eliminate penalties during the final year prior to balloon to facilitate
sale, refinancing and/or renegotiation of loan terms.
WEST: Indicator variable equaling one if the property is located within the West region, zero
otherwise.
NE: Indicator variable equaling one if the property is located within the Northeast region, zero
otherwise.
SE: Indicator variable equaling one if the property is located within the Southeast region, zero
otherwise.
REST: Indicator variable equaling one if the property is located outside the West, Northeast, Southeast
or Midwest regions, zero otherwise.
YIELD : Indicator variable equaling one if the mortgage has a yield maintenance prepayment penalty,
zero otherwise.
FIXED : Indicator variable equaling one if the mortgage has a fixed prepayment penalty, zero
otherwise.
STEP-DOWN: Indicator variable equaling one if the mortgage has a step-down prepayment penalty,
zero otherwise.
LOCKOUT: Indicator variable equaling one if the mortgage has a lockout provision, zero otherwise.
For estimation, this variable is further segmented into LOCKON1 (equal to 1 if the loan is in the
lockout period and zero otherwise) and LOCKOF1 (equal to 1 if the lockout period has expired).
OTHER: Indicator variable equaling one if the mortgage has a prepayment penalty other than listed
above, zero otherwise.
TMTOCLI: ‘‘Time to cliff’’ ⫽ number of months left in the lockout period for loans with lockout provisions, zero if outside lockout period.
TMAFCLI: ‘‘Time after cliff’’ ⫽ number of months after the loan is outside the lockout period, zero if
within lockout period.
PENALRT: Prepayment penalty as a fraction of unpaid loan balance.
REL PEN: Relative penalty ⫽ difference between PENALRT and the minimum PENALRT in the next
three years for loans with step-down or yield maintenance penalties.
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E x h i b i t 8 兩 Proportional Hazard Model of Time to Prepayment

Variable
ORIBAL
RMBALRT
REFIINC
BURNOUT
TSPREAD
VOLATL

Parameter Estimate

Std. Err

1.2E-07

Wald Chi-Square

2.9E-08

16.7

⫺0.13

0.37

0.1

6.65

0.95

49.4

⫺0.07

0.03

4.3

0.47

0.33

2.0

⫺0.06

0.00

228.4

LOANVAL

9.9E-04

3.1E-03

BALLONE

0.57

0.10

32.3

0.1

WEST

⫺0.64

0.13

25.9

NE

⫺0.84

0.17

24.4

SE

⫺0.20

0.18

1.1

REST

⫺0.33

0.12

7.4

YIELD

⫺1.91

0.19

99.5

FIXED

⫺1.38

0.15

88.8

STEPDOWN

⫺1.31

0.32

16.2

LOCKON1

⫺1.76

0.14

154.5

LOCKOF1

⫺0.98

0.17

34.6

Notes: For all mortgages, the dummy variable is property type. N ⫽ 1,156; and ⫺2 log L ⫽
628.0.

penalty). The next lowest was loans with lockout provisions with a risk ratio of
0.17 (during the lockout period, i.e., when LOCKON1⫽1; such loans would have
a risk ratio of 0.38 after expiration of the lockout period, i.e., when LOCKOF1⫽1).
Finally, step-down and fixed penalty loans have comparable risk ratios of 0.27
and 0.25, respectively.
This data was also used to estimate the baseline hazard function, using a functional
form of (ax age ⫹ bx age2 ⫹ cx age3), as discussed above. There are totally
63,558 loan-month observations. The Newton-Raphson method was used to
extract the maximum-likelihood estimates. The results are shown in Exhibit 10.12
Predicted prepayment speeds (CPR) are plotted in Exhibit 11 for an ‘‘average’’
fixed penalty mortgage in the data set (see Exhibit 5). This average mortgage has
an original balance of $455,000, a remaining balance of $438,000, a 7%
refinancing incentive, no burnout, 57.46 volatility, 70% LTV, more than one year
before the balloon date and is located in the Northeast. The baseline hazard shows
a seasoning ramp peak at around three years.
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E x h i b i t 9 兩 Stratified by Penalty Type

兩

ORIBAL

Parameter
Estimate
2.0E-07

Std. Err.
4.1E-08

Wald Chi-Square
22.9

Parameter
Estimate
1.4E-07

Std. Err

Wald Chi-Square

Paramater
Estimate

Std. Err

Wald Chi-Square

6.2E-08

5.4

6.7E-09

5.0E-08

1.8E-02

0.92

2.8

0.14

0.80

2.9E-02

⫺1.77

0.79

5.0

REFIINC

3.87

1.60

5.8

15.76

1.93

67.0

7.74

3.54

4.8

BURNOUT

0.21

0.09

4.8

⫺0.38

0.06

35.5

⫺0.17

0.08

4.2

RMBALRT

0.59

0.1

0.83

0.62

1.8

5.16

1.72

9.0

⫺0.11

0.01

365.3

0.03

0.01

11.6

0.14

0.03

22.6

LOANVAL

⫺0.01

4.2E-03

2.2

0.00

0.01

0.1

0.01

0.01

1.7

BALLONE

0.67

0.12

33.9

0.16

0.23

0.5

0.75

0.73

1.1

TMTOCLI

⫺0.07

0.01

97.9

TMAFCLI

0.02

0.01

5.9

WEST

⫺1.40

0.20

50.6

0.01

0.75

0.0

NE

⫺1.04

0.30

12.4

0.74

0.61

1.5

FIXED

⫺1.16

0.17

48.8
1.14

2.29

0.2

⫺1.37

0.46

8.7

REL PEN
YIELD
⫺2 log L

726.8

210.1

N

757

291

Notes: Fixed penalty includes no penalty. Variable penalty includes yield maintenance and step-down.

61.8
107
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0.16

VOLATL
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TSPREAD

⫺1.54
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The next three proportional hazard models estimated use subsets of the data
stratified by penalty type, with some minor changes to model specification
depending on the particular sample. Exhibit 9 reports results: the first panel shows
lockouts, the second fixed penalty and the third variable penalty. There were a
total of 757 lockout mortgages, of which 385 (51%) prepaid during the observation
window. Since these loans were heavily concentrated in the Midwest, the regional
dummies were excluded. To model the effect of time relative to expiration of the
lockout period, the variables time-to-cliff (TMTOCLI), representing the number
of months remaining in the lockout period (and equal to zero after expiration of
the lockout), and time after cliff (TMAFCLI), the number of months after the
expiration of the lockout (and equal zero if during the lockout period), were
included. Estimated coefficients of these two variables are highly statistically
significant although TMTOCLI is much larger in magnitude. Interpreting results,
for each month farther the loan is from expiration of the lockout period, the hazard
of prepayment declines by about 7%.
Exhibit 9 shows that most of the variables independent of the penalty structure
had similar effects as they did those in the aggregate sample containing all loans
(Exhibit 8). For example, original loan size (ORIBAL) is positive and significant
in both Exhibit 8 and all panels of Exhibit 9. Likewise, refinancing incentive net
of penalty costs (REFIINC) is positive and highly significant across all model
specifications. Burnout has the wrong sign (positive) for LOCKOUT but this is
attributable this to the coding, which does not allow burnout to accumulate during
the lockout period. In Exhibit 8 and the other panels of Exhibit 9, burnout has
the correct, negative sign.
The second panel of Exhibit 9 reports results for mortgages with no or fixed
prepayment penalties (no prepayment penalty can be treated as a fixed penalty at
rate zero). There were a total of 291 loans in this group, including 60 with no
prepayment penalty. Over the observation period, 58% of those with fixed
penalties prepaid while 87% of those with no penalty prepaid. Mortgages were
concentrated in the Midwest, Northeast and West regions, so only two regional
dummies were included. Again, REFIINC is the dominant factor, however in this
regression volatility is positive (wrong sign) and statistically significant. The yield

E x h i b i t 10 兩 Baseline Hazard Estimation

Estimates
Age

Std. Err.

T-Ratio

6.70E-02

6.96E-03

9.63

Age2

⫺1.23E-03

2.26E-04

⫺5.43

Age3

6.63E-06

1.70E-06

3.89
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curve (TSPREAD) is not significant, nor is LTV, as in prior models. The signs on
the regional dummies are the same as in prior models.
The third panel of Exhibit 9 shows the results for variable-prepayment-penalty
mortgages, including step-down and yield maintenance. A total of 107 mortgages
were in this category, with 50 of these (47%) prepaying over the observation
period. Probably due to the smaller sample size, many of the estimates are not
statistically significant. However, in this model the slope of the yield curve
(TSPREAD) is positive and statistically significant as is interest-rate volatility
(VOLATL). A dummy variable YIELD was included to identify a yieldmaintenance loan, which was found to negative and highly statistically significant.
The risk ratio of 0.25 (exponent of ⫺1.37), relative to a step-down penalty, implies
that yield maintenance penalties are highly effective in reducing prepayments.

兩

Conclusion

This study finds strong confirmation that factors expected to affect multifamily
mortgage prepayments do, in fact, conform to theory. Results are generally
consistent with those of Kelley and Slawson (2001), namely, that time-varying
penalty structure alters the value of delay and, hence, alters optimal refinancing.
The dominant influences are those implied by option theory—the value of the
option to refinance net of prepayment penalty costs, the approach of loan maturity
or change in the magnitude of the penalty and rate volatility. Influences unrelated
to the option-theoretic model such as region of the country, burnout and original
loan size were also found to be significant.
The most salient findings, however, relate to the influence of prepayment penalty
structure on hazard rates. Not only was there greater heterogeneity in the actual
prepayment penalty structure than many assume, this heterogeneity was found to
matter. There is clear evidence that the nature and terms of the prepayment penalty
significantly affect the pattern of prepayment on multifamily mortgages and in a
predictable fashion. Any penalty is helpful in reducing prepayments compared to
no penalty. Yield maintenance and lockouts are the most effective among penalty
types, consistent with option theory.13 Fixed and step-down penalties are less
effective, but still important. Prepayments were found to decline on lockoutpenalty loans as time approaches the ‘‘cliff’’ of penalty termination and to rise
immediately after the cliff to a peak, dropping again later, in conformance with
theory. The level of the penalty rate as a fraction of remaining loan balance is
highly significant in discouraging prepayment on notes with fixed penalties.
Finally, with step-down penalties, the rate of decline in the penalty over time is
significant. Both results are consistent with expectations from option theory and
numerical results from our simplified simulations.
There are additional prepayment patterns predicted in the simulations that were
not tested, but the existing evidence is sufficient to conclude that penalty structure
matters and that penalties vary both in type and effect. Both results debunk the
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conventional wisdom—it is only default that matters in pricing commercial
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. Investors in CMBS products should
pay close attention to the actual prepayment penalty structure, for ‘‘the devil is in
the detail,’’ as the saying goes. Lenders offering comparatively weaker penalty
structures should price up at levels reflecting the increase prepayment risk.
Effective pricing models must consider both the presence and structure of
prepayment penalties.

兩

Endnotes
1

Annual CMBS issuance grew from $19.0 in 1995 to $78.3 billion in 1998, declining
after the turmoil of late 1998 to $65.2 billion during 1999 (Wheeler, 2000).
2
Kelley and Slawson (2001), page 251.
3
Some argue that because default and prepayment are substitutes, it is essential to model
them in a competing risk framework. While we agree with this position in theory, there
is no generally accepted way to simulate the property price diffusion process in the
multifamily market, since property values vary with rental and vacancy rates, levels and
trends in operating expense, management and other factors. In contrast, prepayments
vary mainly with interest rates. Moreover, in our empirical data, defaults are de minimus
(approximately a 3% cumulative default rate versus a 54% cumulative prepayment rate).
Ambrose and Lacour-Little (2001) find that with a similar level of default presence,
applying a competing-risks framework has little impact on the empirical results.
4
For the details of constructing binomial trees to simulate the CIR interest rate process,
see Deng (1997).
5
We are indebted to Tony Sanders for providing these results to us.
6
There were 36 defaults out of 1,165 loans in the data set. This represents a 3%
cumulative default rate, as compared to a 54% cumulative prepayment rate. For purposes
of the hazard model, defaulting loans remain at risk of prepayment up until default and
are treated as censored thereafter.
7
Of course, if the default option were permitted, strict enforcement of the lockout clause
would cause an increase in the likelihood of default and in the value of the default
option under those conditions in which rates have dropped considerably and property
values have not risen significantly. A borrower in these circumstances could find the
losses associated with continuing to pay on an above-market note greater than the losses
incurred by loss of one’s equity in the home. See Kau, Keenan, Muller and Epperson
(1992) for a good discussion of the interaction of the prepayment and the default options.
8
. Ambrose and LaCour-Little (2001) used a data set containing 2,699 ARM loans, of
which 78.6% prepaid but only 1.6% defaulted. In their regression results using the Deng,
Quigley and Van Order (2000) competing risk model, none of the results in the default
function were statistically significant.
9
A recent study by Follain, Huang and Ondrich (1999) is an exception. The authors apply
a specification for the baseline hazard function similar to those in this study with similar
results as to the resulting shape after estimation.
10
Financing this sort of property is of increasing interest to the GSEs, given their
congressionally mandated affordable housing goals.
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Re-weighting is required due to the stratified sampling scheme, in which the event of
interest, namely prepayment, is over-sampled relative to the non-event.
During the estimation, the product of baseline hazard and proportional hazard were
bounded to be within zero and one.
As of this writing, underwriters at SalomonSmithBarney tell us that full-term lock-outs
are the industry norm on new CMBS issues. However, one of the authors recently
secured a small commercial mortgage from Bank of America scheduled to be sold into
a CMBS conduit that contained a step-down penalty structure over a 10-year term. We
note in passing that the recently bankrupt Criimi Mae reportedly used step-down
prepayment penalties frequently.
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